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AbSTRACT
In recent years, the number of truth commissions in countries around the 
world has continued to increase, and their scope and functions have become 
much broader. There is, however, still a need for a comprehensive theoreti-
cal framework that will enable scholars to explain the truth commission 
phenomenon. In this article, I will outline a new theoretical framework that 
combines social movement theory and transnational advocacy networks 
theory. I will then apply this framework to the South Korean truth com-
mission experience, and analyze in detail the process that enabled local 
activists to successfully push for the creation of the first South Korean truth 
commission in 2000. Based on the South Korean case, I find that, first of 
all, important national and international factors would not have come 
into play if not for the persistent struggle of local activists. Second, I find 
that local activists were able to make optimal use of these national and 
international opportunity structures to pursue their goals through various 
timely and effective strategies.
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I. INTRoDUCTIoN
The Jeju 4.3 events were a series of armed uprisings and counterinsurgency 
actions that occurred between 1947 and 1954 in Jeju Province, which is the 
largest island in the southernmost part of South Korea.1 The counterinsurgency 
strategy was extremely brutal, involving mass arrests and detentions, forced 
relocations, torture, indiscriminate killings, and many large-scale massacres 
of civilians. “The conflict resulted in an estimated 15,000 to 30,000 deaths, 
which corresponded to 10 percent of the total population of Jeju in 1947.”2 
In 2000, the government established the National Committee for Investigating 
the Truth about the Jeju 4.3 Events and Recovering the Honor of the Victims 
(Jeju Commission). The commission is still in progress at the time of writ-
ing, but is scheduled to end in the near future. To date, the commission has 
identified 15,093 victims, of whom 10,729 (71 percent) were killed, 3,920 
(26 percent) were missing, and 444 (3 percent) were injured or imprisoned. 
Of the individual cases, 78 percent were attributed to state agents such as 
the police, military, and paramilitary groups, and 12 percent to communist 
guerrillas. Most victims were males in their teens and twenties (57 percent), 
but 35 percent were either female or aged under ten or over sixty, a fact that 
indicates the indiscriminate nature of the killings. In addition, the commis-
sion identified 32,403 family members affected by the events.3
Although the enormous civilian death toll was unprecedented, the mas-
sacres were systematically hidden from the general public, and the demand 
for truth and justice was completely suppressed over forty years of dictatorial 
and authoritarian rule. Following democratization in 1987, local students 
and scholars, social activists, and journalists openly established a movement 
to reveal the truth about the civilian massacres, to hold those responsible 
accountable, and to restore the honor of the victims. After thirteen years 
of sustained grassroots advocacy, the Jeju Commission—the first truth com-
mission in South Korea—was established under President Kim Dae Jung.4 
 1. Major historical events in South Korea are remembered by the date on which they oc-
curred. For example, the Korean War (1950–1953), which broke out on 25 June 1950, 
is referred to as the “6.25 War.” Within this tradition, a series of armed conflicts in Jeju, 
triggered by a surprise attack by communist guerrillas on 3 April 1948, is commonly 
referred to as the Jeju 4.3 events. Thus, the Jeju 4.3 events differ from one-off events 
such as the 1972 “Bloody Sunday” shootings in Northern Island.
 2. Hun Joon Kim, Seeking Truth after 50 Years: The National Committee for Investigation of 
the Truth about the Jeju 4.3 Events, 3 Int’l J. trans’l Just. 407 (2009) [hereinafter Seeking 
Truth after 50 Years], available at http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/3/406.full.pdf. 
Accord ProvIncIal 4.3 commIttee, rePort of the JeJu 4.3 vIctIms (Jeju Provincial Council ed., 
1997).
 3. Kim, Seeking Truth after 50 Years, supra note 2, at 411. Accord JeJu commIssIon, offIcIal 
rePort of the natIonal commIttee for InvestIgatIon of the truth about the JeJu 4.3 events (2003).
 4. For Korean names, the family name is presented first (e.g. Kim), followed by the first 
name, which usually consists of two words (e.g. Dae Jung) without a hyphen.
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The commission had three mandates: to investigate and reveal the truth, to 
screen and identify victims, and to restore the honor of the victims.
The commission’s report was published in 2003. This prompted an of-
ficial apology from President Roh Moo Hyun, the first presidential apology 
for the abuse of state power in South Korea. Moreover, President Roh visited 
Jeju on 3 April 2006, where he participated in a memorial service for the 
victims and issued a further apology for the events.5 The government has 
also revised history textbooks and official documents to incorporate material 
about the state violence and civilian massacres. Since then, the commission 
has focused on screening victims, exhumation of mass murder sites, and 
carrying out various commemoration projects, including the establishment 
of the permanent Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation and Jeju 4.3 Memorial Park 
in 2008. The decade-long work of the commission is generally viewed as 
a success, and a dozen other truth commissions have been created in the 
wake of the Jeju Commission.6
The Jeju Commission has gone largely unnoticed by scholars and prac-
titioners around the world. However, the South Korean experience poses an 
important question not only for the study of truth commissions in particular, 
but also for the study of transitional justice more generally. Earlier truth com-
missions like those in Latin America and Africa were set up immediately 
after a political transition. Recent commissions, however, are increasingly 
investigating more historically remote cases, as we have witnessed in Uruguay, 
Panama, and Paraguay.7 Why is there a growing tendency for states to create 
truth commissions to investigate human rights violations in the distant past? 
The question of delayed transitional justice is not limited to the case of truth 
commissions, because a similar pattern exists in recent criminal prosecu-
tions. In recent years, state officials in Argentina, Cambodia, and Uruguay 
have been arrested, prosecuted, and convicted long after their crimes were 
 5. Roh Mu Hyun, Statement of the President on the Jeju April 3 Incident (31 Oct. 2003), 
available at http://www.jeju43.go.kr/english/sub07.html; JeJu commIssIon, supra note 3.
 6. The Jeju Commission provided guidance and expertise to the Presidential Truth Commis-
sion on Suspicious Deaths (2000, 2003) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(2005). In addition, many commissions such as the Special Committee for the Investigation 
of Forced Labor under Japanese Rule and the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspi-
cious Military Deaths were created. Interview with Kim Jong Min, Reporter, Jemin-Ilbo, 
responsible for interviewing and writing the special reports, in Seoul, Korea (2 Dec. 
2011); see also truth and reconcIlIatIon commIssIon rePublIc of Korea, the fInal rePort of 
the truth and reconcIlIatIon commIssIon, rePublIc of Korea § I. the hIstory and actIvItIes of 
the commIssIon & PolIcy recommendatIon, at 8–13 (2010).
 7. Geoff Dancy, Hun Joon Kim & Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, The Turn to Truth: Trends in 
Truth Commission Experimentation, 9 J. hum. rts. 45, 57–58 (2010); PrIscIlla b. hayner, 
unsPeaKable truths: transItIonal JustIce and the challenge of truth commIssIons 63, 251–52 
(2d ed. 2011).
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committed.8 This new tendency to investigate past human rights violations 
has even affected countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia.9 
In this article, this question is answered by applying social movement 
theory and transnational advocacy networks theory. These theories are applied 
to the South Korean experience and analyze in detail the process whereby 
local activists successfully created the Jeju Commission after thirteen years 
of advocacy. It is found that strong and persistent local activism, driven by 
local students and scholars, social movement activists, and journalists was 
the single most important factor in the establishment of the commission. Cer-
tainly, there were a series of significant domestic (democratic consolidation, 
sympathetic political leaders, and national media) and international (diffusion, 
international norms, and pressure from international civil society) factors. 
Nevertheless, these important domestic and international factors would not 
have come into play if not for the persistent struggle of local activists. Further, 
local activists capitalized on these domestic and international opportunities 
to create a truth commission through various timely and effective strategies.
II. A THEoRETICAL FRAMEwoRK
Since the creation of a truth commission is mainly a domestic political process 
influenced by international factors, theories of political science and inter-
national relations are relevant.10 Social movement theory and transnational 
advocacy networks theory provide useful conceptual frameworks for capturing 
the process of truth commission establishment because the demand for truth 
usually takes the form of advocacy. Three elements were considered: agents 
(advocacy networks), structures (domestic and international), and strategic 
interaction between agents and structures.
A. Agent: Advocacy Networks
Advocacy networks are “forms of organization characterized by voluntary, 
reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange” and are 
 8. Dancy, Kim & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, supra note 7, at 45–47; hayner, supra note 7, at 
204–07, 251. 
 9. andrew gunstone, unfInIshed busInesses: the australIan formal reconcIlIatIon Process (Austra-
lian Scholarly Publishing 2007); hayner, supra note 7, at 62, 72–73; Frequently Asked 
Questions, The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, available at http://
www.greensborotrc.org/faq.php.
10. See generally comParatIve PersPectIves on socIal movements (Doug McAdam, John D. Mc-
Carthy & Mayer N. Zald eds.,1996); restructurIng world PolItIcs: transnatIonal socIal 
movements, networKs, and norms (Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 
2002); margaret e. KecK & Kathryn sIKKInK, actIvIsts beyond borders: advocacy networKs In 
InternatIonal PolItIcs (1998); transnatIonal socIal movements and global PolItIcs: solIdarIty 
beyond the state (Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield & Ron Pagnucco eds., 1997).
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characterized by “fluid and open relationships among committed and knowl-
edgeable actors working in specialized issue areas . . . to promote causes, 
principled ideas, and norms.”11 Scholars have identified several key actors 
that facilitate the establishment of truth commissions, such as associations 
of victims’ families, human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
student activists, lawyers, intellectuals, and the media.12 Advocacy networks 
are usually motivated by their values and beliefs, such as empathy, altruism, 
or ideational commitment, and their goal is to secure the establishment of a 
truth commission by influencing the government and the general public.13
b. Structures: Domestic and International
Structures are those consistent “dimensions of the political environment that 
provide incentives [for or constraints on people undertaking] collective ac-
tion.”14 Structures constitute a powerful set of constraints and opportunities 
that affect advocacy networks. Sometimes, structures facilitate the forma-
tion and development of the advocacy and other times structures limit its 
development. There are generally two types of structures affecting advocacy 
networks: domestic and international. Scholars of transitional justice have 
pointed to various domestic structures that serve to facilitate or constrain 
advocacy networks, such as mature democracy, sympathetic political lead-
ers, national media coverage, the government’s respect for human rights, 
the power balance between old and new elites, and economic conditions.15 
Likewise, they have stressed several international structures: the develop-
11. KecK & sIKKInK, supra note 10, at 8.
12. See generally David Pion-Berlin, To Prosecute or to Pardon? Human Rights Decisions 
in the Latin American Southern Cone, 16 hum. rts. Q. 105 (1994); Elin Skaar, Truth 
Commissions, Trials: Or Nothing? Policy Options in Democratic Transitions, 20 thIrd 
world Q. 1109 (1999); David Backer, Civil Society and Transitional Justice: Possibili-
ties, Patterns and Prospects, 2 J. hum. rts. 297 (2003); Mô Bleeker & Jonathan Sisson, 
Dealing with the Past: Critical Issue, Lessons Learned, and Challenges for Future Swiss 
Policy (Swisspeace, Working Paper No. 2, 2004), available at http://www.swisspeace.
ch/publications/working-papers-archive.html#c881.
13. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 
52 Int’l org. 887, 898 (1998).
14. sIdney tarrow, Power In movement: socIal movements and contentIous PolItIcs 76–77 (2d ed. 
1998).
15. See generally trIcIa d. olsen, leIgh a. Payne & andrew g. reIter, transItIonal JustIce In bal-
ance: comParIng Processes, weIghIng effIcacy (2010); samuel P. huntIngton, the thIrd wave: 
democratIzatIon In the late twentIeth century (1991); Luc Huyse, Justice after Transition: 
On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the Past, 20 l. & soc. InQuIry. 51 
(1995); carlos santIago nIno, radIcal evIl on trIal (1996); from dIctatorshIP to democracy: 
coPIng wIth the legacIes of authorItarIanIsm and totalItarIanIsm (John H. Herz ed., 1982); 
Jorge Correa Sutil in collaboration with Francisco Jiménez, “No Victorious Army Has Ever 
Been Prosecuted . . .”: The Unsettled Story of Transitional Justice in Chile, in transItIonal 
JustIce and the rule of law In new democracIes 123 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997); Jon 
elster, closIng the booKs: transItIonal JustIce In hIstorIcal PersPectIve (2004).
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ment and effect of international ideas and norms such as human rights or 
individual accountability, the diffusion of neighbors’ experience, and pressure 
from international organizations and international civil society.16
C. Strategic Interactions
Advocacy networks pursue various strategies in order to achieve their in-
tended goals within given domestic and international structures. Margaret 
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink provide a useful categorization of the strategies 
used by advocacy networks: information politics, symbolic politics, leverage 
politics, and accountability politics. Information politics refers to the ability 
to quickly and credibly generate politically useful information and move it 
to where it will have the most impact; symbolic politics refers to the ability 
to call upon symbols, actions, or stories that make sense of a situation for an 
audience; leverage politics refers to the ability to call upon powerful actors 
to affect a situation in which weaker members of a network are unlikely to 
have influence; and accountability politics refers to the effort to hold power-
ful actors to their previously stated policies or principles.17
III. ADVoCACY NETwoRKS IN SoUTH KoREA
The path towards the establishment of the first truth commission in South 
Korea was a long and painstaking journey. The Rhee Syng Man dictatorship, 
which was responsible for the massacres, lasted six more years before Rhee 
was ousted out in 1960. Although a short-lived democracy followed, it was 
soon overthrown in a coup by Park Chung Hee in 1961. No one publicly 
spoke of the Jeju 4.3 events under these dictatorial regimes for over thirty 
years, and critical evidence of the massacres was systematically destroyed.18 
The suppression continued when Chun Doo Hwan seized power in another 
coup after the death of Park in 1979. Chun’s authoritarian regime lasted 
until 1987, when his proclaimed successor Roh Tae Woo agreed to direct 
presidential elections.
16. hayner, supra note 7; Kathryn sIKKInK, the JustIce cascade: how human rIghts ProsecutIons 
are changIng world PolItIcs 20–24 (2011); Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Ac-
countability: New Approaches to Past Abuses, 19 am. u. Int’l l. rev. 301, 314–18 (2003); 
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Civil Society in Processes of Accountability, in Post-conflIct JustIce 
97, 97–98 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002); martha mInow, between vengeance and forgIve-
ness: facIng hIstory after genocIde and mass vIolence 9, 23 (1998); Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., 
International Truth Commissions and Justice, 5 asPen Inst. Q. 69 (1993).
17. KecK & sIKKInK, supra note 10, at 16.
18. Kim, Seeking Truth after 50 Years, supra note 2, at 407; see also JeJu commIssIon, JeJu sasam 
sageon JInsang Josa bogoseo (rePort of the truth about the JeJu 4.3 events), at 36 (2003); 
Dong-Choon Kim, The Long Road toward Truth and Reconciliation, 42 crItIcal asIan 
stud. 535 (2010). 
Vol. 34732 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Strong and persistent local advocacy was the single most important fac-
tor in the process of seeking transitional justice. The role of local advocacy 
was central and indispensable to the establishment of the Jeju Commission. 
Various actors played a significant role in different phases of the activism, 
but three local actors—students and scholars, social movement activists, and 
journalists—played the most important and consistent roles in the move-
ment. These actors were mostly motivated by the pursuit of truth, a sense of 
justice, compassion and empathy, historical consciousness, and conscience. 
They continued to believe strongly in their cause despite manifest and se-
vere suppression and surveillance. In addition, other actors such as victims, 
writers and artists, local politicians, and national political leaders played a 
vital role during particular phases.
Of the three crucial actors, students—and to some extent, scholars and 
intellectuals—were the ones that courageously made the first move and took 
the initiative in the movement, thus inspiring the other actors. A small group 
of students at Jeju National University initiated the first public investigation 
of the massacres in 1960, during a short period of democracy.19 Inspired by 
the students’ activism, a local newspaper, the Jeju-Shinbo, began the first 
province-wide investigation of the massacres, and this became a stepping-
stone for later government investigations. Before and after democratization, 
students were among a handful of social groups that openly advocated 
transitional justice and organized public demonstrations. In 1993, students 
began a petition movement, by submitting a signed petition to the legislature 
calling on it to investigate and act upon the civilian massacres.20 This was 
a significant move, marking the inclusion of what had previously been a 
local issue on the national political agenda.21 Finally, the student movement 
served as an important locus for nurturing major activists and sympathetic 
researchers who devoted their full energies to the movement.
Second, local social movement activists and organizations formed strong 
advocacy networks in Jeju. During and after the transition to democracy, 
many organizations were created to focus on labor, human rights, national 
unification, the environment, farmers, women, social justice, culture, political 
reform, and transitional justice issues. Since 1989, these groups have jointly 
organized an annual memorial service and art festival every April in order 
to commemorate the Jeju 4.3 events. Meetings to plan these commemora-
tive activities provided an opportunity for local activists to meet and share 
information, expertise, and strategies. This collaboration created “a common 
19. Interview with Lee Moon Kyo, leader of the student movement at Jeju National University, 
in Jeju, Korea (22 Apr. 2006).
20. Interview with Oh Young Hoon, Chairperson of the Jeju Student Association in 1993, 
in Jeju, Korea (2 May 2011).
21. Interview with Byun Jeong Il, Congressman representing Jeju in 1993 and presented 
students’ petition to the National Assembly, in Jeju, Korea (10 May 2011).
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identity for the social movement groups and enhanced further collaboration 
and communication among groups.”22 In the process, these organizations 
developed a strong sense of solidarity that centered on the issue of the civil-
ian massacres. In the later period of advocacy, local activists were able to 
work closely together by creating an overarching organization to maximize 
the effectiveness of the movement. In 1998, local activists successfully publi-
cized their cause by organizing a year-long 50th anniversary commemoration 
of the Jeju 4.3 events incorporating art, traditional rituals, cultural projects, 
testimonial hearings, and academic conferences. The following year, activ-
ists pursued an intensive political campaign to enact special legislation that 
provided redress for the civilian massacres. During the course of that year, 
local activists led the national campaign to press for legislation, as well as 
organizing weekly rallies in Seoul and Jeju.23
Third, local journalists played a significant role in the advocacy process. 
As noted earlier, it was a local newspaper, the Jeju-Shinbo that initiated the 
first province-wide fact-finding project in 1960, inspired by the student activ-
ists. Although the newspaper uncovered only one-tenth of the total number 
of victims that were eventually identified in 2003, it revealed an important 
aspect of the massacres by confirming that the majority of the killings were 
committed by the military and the police.24 After democratization in 1987, 
the Jemin-Ilbo published 456 special reports on the Jeju 4.3 events and civil-
ian massacres over nine years, based on interviews with more than 3,000 
witnesses. This extensive newspaper coverage played an indispensable role 
in the advocacy process by publicizing the massacres and establishing the 
Jeju 4.3 events and massacres as key social issue.25 Moreover, the coverage 
was remarkably effective in encouraging victims, who had been stigmatized 
as communists and intimidated by the state violence and subsequent sup-
pression, to actively participate in the movement.26 Finally, the knowledge 
and expertise gained in the course of the journalists’ investigations laid the 
foundations for the official report of the Jeju Commission. Both Yang Jo Hoon 
and Kim Jong Min, who played a significant role in writing special reports 
for the Jemin-Ilbo, later worked in key posts for the Jeju Commission and 
transmitted their expertise and knowledge to the commission.
22. Interview with Oh Seung Kook, Secretary General of the 4.3 Research Institute and 
former President of the Jeju Cultural Movement Association, in Jeju, Korea (7 Apr. 2006).
23. JeJu commIssIon, supra note 18, at 38–39.
24. “By 10th, 1,259 applications arrived; 1,172 male victims and 285 female victims, victims 
from 10-day-old to 93-year-old.” JeJu-shInbo, 13 June 1960, in JEJU COMMISSION, JeJu 
4.3 sageon JaryoJIP 3: sInmun-Pyeon (JeJu 4.3 events archIve, vol. 3: newsPaPers), at 337–38 
(2002).
25. guI-suK Kwon, gIeoK-euI JeongchI: daeryang haKsal-euI sahoeJeoK gIeoK-gua yeoKsaJeoK JInsIl 
(memory and PolItIcs: socIal memory and hIstorIcal truth of massacres) 198 (Munhakgua 
Jiseong ed., 2006).
26. Interview with Kim Jong Min, Reporter, Jemin-Ilbo, responsible for interviewing and 
writing the special reports, in Seoul, Korea (25 May 2006).
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In the remainder of this article, I examine how the local advocacy 
networks of students, activists, and journalists examine how the move-
ment advanced in the face of the domestic and international structures. For 
my study, I chose three domestic (democratic consolidation, sympathetic 
political leaders, and national media) and international (diffusion, interna-
tional norms, and pressure from international civil society) structures that 
influenced the establishment of the truth commission. I address the issue of 
how advocacy networks contributed to creating these conducive and open 
structures in the first place. In addition, I show how advocacy networks 
interpreted, reframed, and interacted with these domestic and international 
structures in order to make effective use of the opportunities to further the 
movement, employing various strategies— information, symbolic, leverage, 
and accountability politics.
IV. LoCAL ADVoCACY IN THE DoMESTIC STRUCTURE
A. Democratic Consolidation
Although there were a few sporadic and individual attempts to address 
the Jeju 4.3 events and civilian massacres over the years, such efforts were 
systematically suppressed by the dictatorial and authoritarian regimes of the 
day. During this period efforts to question, remember, and seek justice for 
the unjustifiable state violence were made on several occasions by family 
members of the victims, students, journalists, and a few courageous artists 
and writers. The most meaningful breakthrough came in 1978 when Hyun 
Ki Young, a writer from Jeju, published a short story about the Bukchon 
massacre, which formed part of the Jeju 4.3 events.27 This was a critical 
moment in transitional justice history because it marked the first public 
mention of the Jeju 4.3 events and civilian massacres after three decades of 
total silence. However, the government suppression and surveillance again 
intensified after this, and there was no further mention of the Jeju 4.3 events 
until the democratic transition.28
South Korea’s transition to democracy in 1987 brought a significant 
change in the domestic political structure. In 1991, the central government 
began to transfer administrative and legislative power to local governments 
and councils by reviving the regional self-governance system. At the very 
first meeting of the Jeju local council, the civilian massacres during the Jeju 
27. gI-yeong hyun, sunI samchon (aunt sunI) (Changbi Publishers, Inc. 1979).
28. Jong Min Kim, Fifty Years after 4.3, in study of JeJu 4.3 341 (Jeju 4.3 Research Institute 
ed., 1999).
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4.3 events were raised as the first agenda item by a local council member. 
The members of the council were sensitive to local people’s demands on 
this issue because they were all elected representatives of local cities and 
counties, and it was impossible to find any city and county that had not 
been affected by the Jeju 4.3 events. The local people’s demand for truth and 
justice was therefore able to be effectively channeled through these local 
council members. Local advocacy networks made the most of this opportunity 
to advance the transitional justice movement. As a result, the Provincial 4.3 
Committee, a special committee to address the Jeju 4.3 events and civil-
ian massacres, was set up in 1992 under the local council. The Provincial 
4.3 Committee, which had three terms up to 1999, played a critical role 
by conducting an official investigation, encouraging ideologically opposed 
groups to cooperate, and leading the province-wide petition movement.29
The transition to democracy was certainly a precondition for the move-
ment. A maturing democracy provided an open and favorable domestic 
structure for transitional justice advocacy, and the creation of the Provincial 
4.3 Committee was made possible mainly by the decentralization of politi-
cal power. However, if we take a closer look at the process, we can see the 
centrality of the local advocacy networks. Democratization and the decen-
tralization of power was itself the result of a long and painful struggle for 
democracy by various social movement activists across the country, including 
those in Jeju. In other words, the fact that favorable space opened up with 
democratization is not something that should be taken as a matter of course; 
rather, it was the result of persistent local activism. The core members of 
the advocacy networks—students, activists, and journalists—were all heavily 
involved in the democratization movement. In 1987 and even before, local 
activists and organizations were part of an underground pro-democracy 
movement under the authoritarian government of Chun Doo Hwan. Thus, 
democracy was not an exogenously given structure but a condition made 
possible by local advocacy networks.
Second, the combined efforts of local research and social movement 
organizations and the media were invaluable in creating the Provincial 4.3 
Committee within the Jeju local council. Although the civilian massacres 
were raised as the first agenda item at the first plenary session of the local 
council, members of the council were still hesitant to take decisive action. 
Due to the social stigma associated with the Jeju 4.3 events, few members 
openly advocated for transitional justice.30 The decisive blow came from civil 
society and social movement groups. The Jeju 4.3 Research Institute and the 
Jemin-Ilbo jointly announced the existence of the Darangshi cave, where 
29. ProvIncIal 4.3 commIttee, supra note 2.
30. Interview with Kim Young Hoon, Chairperson of the first and second term Provincial 
4.3 Committees, in Jeju, Korea (7 Apr. 2006).
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they had discovered the skeletal remains of eleven victims, including women 
and children, who had taken refuge in the cave but had been killed by the 
military and police. This event was widely publicized in local and national 
news media and, on the same day, local council members officially agreed 
to establish the Provincial 4.3 Committee.31 It is clear that local activists and 
journalists were influential in creating the critical momentum for subsequent 
advocacy. The activists used strategies of information and symbolic politics. 
The cave was discovered in December but kept under wraps for three months 
to maximize the impact of the announcement by timing it just before 3 April 
1992.32 In the meantime, activists gathered as much information as possible 
on the cave, with the assistance of local media and other experts such as 
doctors, lawyers, and anthropologists. The activists knew the importance of 
the cave and prepared for the announcement for three months in order to 
achieve the desired effect.
With the discovery of the cave, the activists were in possession of 
consequential information that had the power to change the path of their 
advocacy, and they mobilized this information at just the right moment. In 
addition, they understood, and were able to effectively utilize the symbolic 
significance of the cave. Kim Dong Man, a professor who was a Secretary 
General of the Jeju 4.3 Research Institute at the time of discovery of the cave, 
argued that the cave represented and symbolized the failure to address the 
civilian massacres themselves:
Fifty year-old corpses still lying in the cold Darangshi cave unattended. . . . This 
is exactly the same as the status of the Jeju 4.3 events and civilian massacres, 
which have been suppressed and forgotten for over [fifty] years. The corpses in 
the cave are a symbol that shows that the Jeju 4.3 events and civilian massacres 
have not been resolved.33
Due to its importance as a symbol of the Jeju 4.3 events and transitional 
justice advocacy, a replica of the Darangshi cave has been created in the 
center of the Jeju 4.3 Memorial Park.
Finally, advocacy networks effectively supported the activities of the 
Provincial 4.3 Committee. Without the support and assistance of civil soci-
ety and activist groups, the Provincial 4.3 Committee would not have been 
able to make such an important contribution to the cause. One reason for 
this is that it was difficult to recruit members for the committee’s first term. 
31. Angela Kim, Darangshi Cave Unearths Yet More Jeju Massacre Tragedy, the JeJu weeKly, 
23 Mar. 2012; Kim, supra note 2, at 407; see also Special Reporting Team, Discovered 
Eleven Skeletal Remains of the 4.3 Victims, JemIn-Ilbo, 2 Apr. 1992; Heo Ho Joon, Dis-
covery of 11 Skeletal Remains of the 4.3 Victims, hanKyoreh, 2 Apr. 1992.
32. Interview with Kang Chang Il, Board Member of the Jeju 4.3 Research Institute in 1992, 
in Jeju, Korea (8 May 2011). 
33. Interview with Kim Dong Man, Former Secretary General of the Jeju 4.3 Research Institute 
who discovered the cave, in Jeju, Korea (12 Apr. 2006).
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Although most council members supported the idea of transitional justice, 
they did not want to be directly involved in the process. However, the situa-
tion changed dramatically when the seven committee members from the first 
term were all reelected in a landslide, with the strong support of victims and 
activists.34 Similarly, the first chairperson of the Provincial 4.3 Committee, 
Kim Young Hoon, was later elected as mayor of Jeju City with the support 
of social movement organizations and victims’ associations.35 In addition, 
major projects of the Provincial 4.3 Committee—the official investigation, 
united memorial service, and petition movement—were all carried out by 
local social movement organizations. The information, expertise, and per-
sonnel supplied by the local advocacy networks were a main element in 
the work of the Provincial 4.3 Committee.
b. Sympathetic Leader
The second most important factor in the opening up of the domestic structure 
was the inauguration of President Kim Dae Jung in 1998. Although Kim Dae 
Jung had retired from politics after being defeated by Kim Young Sam in the 
1992 presidential election, he returned to win the 1997 election. Kim Dae 
Jung’s political constituency was based in Jeolla and Jeju provinces, and he 
pledged several times during the campaign to address the issue of the Jeju 
massacres. Certainly, Kim Dae Jung, with his strong commitment to human 
rights, played a significant role in transitional justice advocacy. Like mature 
democracies, sympathetic and committed leaders create a structure conducive 
to advocacy. The inauguration of Kim Dae Jung was a precondition for the 
creation of the Jeju Commission. However, closer examination reveals that 
although it was a necessary condition, it was not a sufficient condition—if 
not for the pressure and input of local activists, even Kim Dae Jung’s resolve 
would not have been sufficient to create the truth commission.
The first evidence for this contention can be found in Kim Dae Jung’s 
first public statement on the Jeju 4.3 events in 1987 when he visited Jeju 
during his presidential campaign, immediately after democratization:
People in Jeju have suffered the tragedy of the Jeju 4.3 events. I will be with you 
in your regrets, pain, and hope. The military and authoritarian governments also 
falsely accused me of being a communist and I myself am a victim. If I am in 
power, I will investigate the truth of the Jeju 4.3 events, where people have been 
falsely accused of being communists, and will restore the honor of the victims.36
34. Interview with Kim Young Hoon, supra note 30.
35. Yang Seong Cheol, Newly-Elected Major of Jeju City Kim Yeong Hun, Joongang-Ilbo, 6 
June 2006.
36. Cited in Kim, supra note 28.
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He further pledged during his presidential campaign in 1992 that he would 
enact special legislation. Before he was elected in 1998, Kim Dae Jung 
made 12 public pledges on this issue, and these statements later provided 
a highly useful and effective tool that enabled activists to exert pressure on 
politicians, party members, and members of congress.37 All of these pledges 
stemmed from the 1987 statement, and one local intellectual, who had long 
been involved with the movement, played a significant role.
Professor Ko Chang Hoon was responsible for drafting Kim Dae Jung’s 
Jeju address in 1987, and for the decision to include the Jeju 4.3 events 
and massacres in the statement.38 According to Professor Ko, Professor Lee 
Moon Young, a professor at Korea University, sent him a note the day before 
Kim Dae Jung’s arrival in Jeju asking him to draft a campaign address that 
would stand out from those of the other candidates. Professor Ko, who had 
been studying the Jeju 4.3 events, firmly believed that these events should 
be included in Kim Dae Jung’s address. When Kim Dae Jung delivered his 
address, it caused a sensation, not only among people in Jeju but also in 
Seoul. Thus, Kim Dae Jung’s first presidential pledge was the result of the 
activism and research of one intellectual. Even though it was Kim Dae Jung 
himself who promised to deliver truth and reparations for the victims of the 
Jeju 4.3 events, the cumulative efforts and research of local activists were 
an indispensable prerequisite for his pledge. Even this considerable com-
mitment from a sympathetic leader was made possible by local activism.
Even under Kim’s tenure, constant activism and persistent demands from 
civil society played a more important role than Kim Dae Jung’s political 
will and promises alone. This is because leaders can—either intentionally 
or unintentionally—forget or fail to follow through with their promises. In 
addition, it is possible that the measures adopted by national politicians 
may fall short of the expectations of the victims and activists. Kim Dae Jung 
spent the first three years of his presidency rebuilding the Korean economy 
in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Economic recovery was 
the primary goal of his administration at that time, and it was successful in 
avoiding the possibility of state bankruptcy.39 By contrast, the transitional 
justice measures Kim Dae Jung and his party introduced during the first 
two years of his tenure—establishing a special committee within the ruling 
party—fell far short of the expectations of people in Jeju. In addition, the 
special committee’s only activities during its first year were two public hear-
ings, which greatly disappointed the victims and activists.40
37. Kim, Seeking Truth after 50 Years, supra note 2.
38. Interview with Ko Chang Hoon, Professor Jeju National University and former Director 
Jeju 4.3 Research Institute, in Jeju, Korea (24 Mar. 2006).
39. The Nobel Foundation, Kim Dae-jung—Biography 2012, available at http://www.nobel-
prize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/aureates/2000/dae-jung-bio.html.
40. Kim, Seeking Truth after 50 Years, supra note 2, at 418. 
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From that time local advocacy networks actively pursued a political 
campaign to enact special legislation to create a truth commission. The Jeju 
Commission would not have been established if the activists and victims 
had passively waited for Kim Dae Jung to take the next step. The process of 
transitional justice did not proceed smoothly, even with Kim Dae Jung’s party 
in power. Despite persistent demands for special legislation to be passed, 
the ruling party only proposed to establish a special congressional commit-
tee, and even submitted a resolution to that effect. The ruling party’s central 
organization even ignored the demands of its local branch for a change of 
policy on the Jeju issue.41 It was only through activism and lobbying that 
activists and victims were able to influence the policy of the ruling party 
and break the impasse. At every point, activists strategically employed Kim 
Dae Jung’s public commitments, in order to force passive and uninterested 
politicians to move forward and take action, making this situation a good 
example of the accountability politics of advocacy networks.42
C. National Media
The mass media, especially the national media, played a significant role in 
publicizing the civilian massacres and bringing this neglected issue to public 
attention. The Jeju 4.3 events, which had long been taboo due to their as-
sociation with communism, were addressed for the first time in the popular 
television drama series, The Eye of the Dawn, in 1992. Many interviewees 
have told me that the screening of these episodes was considered a “highly 
sensational event” in Jeju.43 It was sensational in three respects. First, the 
television series in question was a particularly popular one, which constantly 
had an audience rating of fifty percent or more. Second, the Jeju 4.3 events 
were the main theme of the drama across four episodes, which screened 
over a two-week period. Third, the Jeju 4.3 events were not portrayed in 
these episodes from the dominant anticommunist perspective; rather, the 
screenwriter had tried to treat both ideological perspectives fairly. In other 
words, the episodes touched on the Jeju 4.3 events not only as a communist 
rebellion but also in terms of human rights abuses and a democratic upris-
ing, through the eyes of the characters. Some of the lines delivered by Jeju 
residents in the drama include: “We are facing either starving to death or 
41. Id. at 418, 421.
42. Congresswoman Choo Mi Ae of the ruling party played a significant role in bringing the 
Jeju 4.3 events onto the national political agenda and urging the ruling party to honor 
its commitments. For more detail, see Kim, Seeking Truth after 50 Years, supra note 2, 
at 406, 418. 
43. Interview with Park Chan Sik, Director of the Jeju 4.3 Research Institute, in Jeju, Korea 
(6 Apr. 2006). 
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being beaten to death. Even a worm will turn”; “Why do the members of 
the rightist youth group use violence against us? The police are protecting 
and using these groups and there is an American at the top”; and “Will the 
government treat 300,000 Jeju residents as enemies simply to destroy a few 
communists?”44 These words reflected a perspective that had not previously 
been aired in public arenas such as politics, media, or education. Due to 
the popularity of the show, the national news media started to show interest 
in the Jeju 4.3 events as well.
What made this initial television exposure possible? One answer lies in 
screenwriter Song Ji Na, who had spent around four years at high school in 
Jeju. In an interview with a local newspaper, Song explained that she had 
a desire to tackle the Jeju 4.3 events as a screenwriter, but had considered 
it impossible to create an entire drama that focused exclusively on these 
events. Song, and later the show’s producer, admitted that the flow of the 
drama had actually been compromised by the inclusion of the Jeju 4.3 
events, which had not been discussed in the original novel on which the 
series was based. Nevertheless, both screenwriter and producer had decided 
to sacrifice the artistic values of the drama in order to reveal this historic 
injustice.45 This came through clearly in Song’s interview:
People criticized me for raking up the tragic past. However, I thought that it 
was my duty as a screenwriter to address a past history of injustice, if it really 
existed. I believe the only way to prevent historical wrongs from repeating 
themselves over and over again in the future is through the investigation and 
thorough study of what went wrong.46
However, Song’s will, vision, and desire were not the only contributing fac-
tors. Song has acknowledged that these episodes of the drama would not 
have been possible if not for the efforts of journalists from the Jemin-Ilbo, 
who provided the factual details on which the episodes were based. Thus, 
the programs were a collaborative effort between the local mass media and 
one courageous screenwriter.
44. Yeomyeong-eui Nundongja (Eye of Dawn) (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation, Episodes 
29–32, television show broadcast from 7 Oct. 1991 to 6 Feb. 1992).
45. Heo Young Bae, An Epic Drama: The Eye of the Dawn, JemIn-Ilbo, 7 Nov. 1991.
46. Kim Jong Min, Jeju 4.3 Too Big To Fit in a TV Drama: Interview with Song Ji Na, JemIn-
Ilbo, 7 Feb. 1992.
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V. LoCAL ADVoCACY IN THE INTERNATIoNAL STRUCTURE
A. Diffusion
In my cross-national study of truth commissions worldwide, I found com-
pelling evidence of the diffusion effect of the truth commission experience 
of neighboring countries. States are more likely to use truth commissions 
after democratization if such commissions have already been established 
by their neighbors.47 The diffusion factor is a crucial element of the interna-
tional structure affecting the advocacy process. Good examples and effective 
strategies in a neighboring country with a similar history of human rights 
violations tend to open up a space for domestic advocacy, while negative 
or failed examples are likely to serve as a constraint on local advocacy. 
The Jeju case was influenced by the positive impact of the truth commis-
sion that had been established in Taiwan.48 Taiwan’s so-called 2.28 events 
and transitional justice experience had a distinct impact on the path to the 
creation of the Jeju Commission.
The 2.28 events occurred under Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang in 1947, 
when Taiwan was a peripheral island in the southern part of China that was 
inhabited by the Taiwanese aboriginal people. The crisis was sparked by the 
confiscation of cigarettes and money from an indigenous old woman in a 
street kiosk by a few policemen and government agents, on charges of illegal 
importation. When the old woman and her sons resisted, she was beaten to 
death by the police.49 The local Taiwanese were outraged and vehemently 
protested against the Chiang Kai-Shek regime. However, the government 
brutally suppressed the public protest, arguing that it had been instigated, 
planned, and supported by the communists on the mainland. However, in 
the course of the subsequent official investigation, scholars were unable to 
find any evidence that the protest had been ordered or instigated by the 
Chinese Communist Party; it was simply a protest against the unfair treat-
ment of aboriginal Taiwanese, not a communist rebellion.50
As with the Jeju 4.3 events, the counterinsurgency strategies in Taiwan 
were extremely violent and resulted in the deaths of approximately 20,000 
47. Hun Joon Kim, Expansion of Transitional Justice Measures: A Comparative Analysis of 
Its Causes, 26 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota).
48. Kim Jong Min, The Taiwanese 2.28 Events: A Similar Case to the Jeju 4.3 Events, JemIn-
Ilbo, 21 Apr. 1993.
49. Laurence Eyton, National Identity Formation in Settler Societies, in natIonal cheng-
chI unIversIty collectIon 128 (2008), available at http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstre
am/140.119/37472/10/92401510.pdf. 
50. Lee Hsiao-feng, The Real Cause of the 228 Incident, taIPeI tImes, 4 Mar. 2010, at 8, avail-
able at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2010/03/04/2003467130. 
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civilians. However, the Chiang Kai-Shek government declared martial law 
in Taiwan and the truth was concealed for more than forty years. With Tai-
wan’s democratic transition in 1987, victims and activists demanded that 
the truth of the massacres be revealed, paving the way for reparations for 
the victims and their families. In 1995, five years before the establishment 
of the Jeju Commission, the Lee Teng-Hui government enacted legislation 
to investigate the massacres and make reparations to the victims. After a 
year-long investigation, the government announced that 18,000 to 20,000 
victims had been killed and, most notably, declared that Chiang Kai-Shek 
himself had been responsible for issuing the order to kill civilians. In ad-
dition, the government declared 28 February a national memorial day to 
commemorate the 2.28 events and their civilian victims.51
The Taiwanese case was first publicized in South Korea by a local 
newspaper in Jeju, the Jemin-Ilbo.52 The media followed the developments 
in Taiwan closely, and this case provided inspiration not only to activists but 
also to the general public. Many interviewees—both activists and victims—
referred to the Taiwanese massacres and transitional justice process.53 The 
Taiwanese experience was critical in stimulating local advocacy networks to 
continuously use a petition to propel the Jeju 4.3 events onto the national 
political stage. The Jeju local council, under the leadership of the Provincial 
4.3 Committee, submitted a petition to the legislature in 1993.54 This marked 
the entry of what had been a local Jeju issue onto the national political 
scene. Kim Young Hoon, a chairperson of the Provincial 4.3 Committee, 
told me that committee members had learned the importance of petitions 
from the Taiwanese experience on their official visit to Taiwan in 1993 to 
study the case and seek advice.55 The petition submitted by the local council 
clearly mentions the Taiwanese experience and contrasts developments in 
Jeju with those in Taiwan.
However, my study again shows that local activism was an indispensable 
element in both publicizing and capitalizing on this favorable and noteworthy 
international precedent. First of all, the Taiwanese case was initially raised 
by a reporter at the Jemin-Ilbo, Kim Jong Min, who saw considerable paral-
lels between the Taiwanese 2.28 events and the Jeju 4.3 events in terms of 
their characteristics, time and location, perpetrators, number of victims, and 
aftermath.56 Interestingly, the publicity given to the Taiwanese case in South 
51. DPP Questions Former Premier Hau’s 228 Victim Figures, chIna Post, 29 Feb. 2012, avail-
able at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2012/02/29/333129/
DPP-questions.htm. 
52. Kim, The Taiwanese 2.28 Events, supra note 48.
53. Interview with Byun Jeong Il, supra note 21; interview with Choo Mi Ae, Congress-
woman, in Seoul, Korea (23 May 2011).
54. JeJu commIssIon, supra note 3. 
55. Interview with Kim Young Hoon, supra note 30.
56. Interview with Kim Jong Min, supra note 26.
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Korea was not triggered by or related to a particular event in Taiwan such 
as the establishment of the commission or the presidential apology. Rather, 
it was publicized by a concerned local journalist in South Korea who had 
been involved in the movement and was eager to achieve a breakthrough. 
It was made possible by the keen eyes of Kim Jong Min, which had been 
sharply focused on the Jeju 4.3 events as he collected data and interviewed 
witnesses in the process of writing weekly reports on the Jeju 4.3 issue.57 
Even though the Taiwanese case did not receive extensive coverage in other 
national newspapers, one local journalist read an international news article 
and saw the potential of the Taiwanese case to inspire and guide the transi-
tional justice movement in Jeju. This single international news report could 
easily have been overlooked among the thousands of other news stories 
that appeared that day.
After the local Jeju community became aware of the Taiwanese case, local 
activists engaged in information politics in order to maximize the impact of 
the Taiwanese example. Kim made the significant move of asking scholars 
who majored in contemporary Chinese history to analyze the Taiwanese 
2.28 events, and then published a series of commentaries comparing the 
Taiwanese case to the Jeju 4.3 events.58 Lee Young Hee, a respected historian, 
explained that both events had occurred in the late 1940s, immediately after 
World War II; in both cases systemic and province-wide massacres had been 
committed by anticommunist governments in the name of counterinsurgency; 
both events were characterized as communist rebellions instigated by the 
communist party, which was a major enemy of the state at that time; the 
truth had been suppressed under consecutive anticommunist regimes; and 
the number of victims who had been killed was more than 15,000 in both 
cases.59 The stark similarities between the massacres in Taiwan and Jeju 
initially appealed to many local activists, media representatives, and politi-
cians. This simple information on the experience of a neighboring country 
would not have been a significant factor in itself, but became useful once 
it had been strategically studied, understood, and reinterpreted by local 
activists. With their efforts, the Taiwanese case was no longer an event that 
had simply occurred in a neighboring country, but an event that was highly 
relevant to Jeju. In sum, the Taiwanese experience had a substantial impact 
on the Jeju case because the locals actively sought to use it to their benefit. 
It was local activists who ensured that the Taiwanese experience had an 
influence on the South Korean transitional justice process.
57. See JeJu commIssIon, hwahae-wa sangsaeng: JeJu 4.3 wIweonhoe hwaldong bogoseo (reconcIlI-
atIon and coexIstence: rePort on the actIvItIes of the JeJu commIssIon), at 92 (2008).
58. Lee Young Hee, The Truth about the Taiwanese 2.28 Events, JemIn-Ilbo, 2 June 1993.
59. Id.; see also DPP Questions Former Premier Hau’s 228 Victim Figures, supra note 55.
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b. International Norms
Constructivists in international relations have studied international norms, 
which are “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a 
given identity.”60 Scholars suggest that there is a growing norm relating to 
individual criminal accountability and institutionalized truth-telling about past 
human rights violations.61 This norm is closely related to the development 
of international human rights norms, since accountability and truth-telling 
are about the past human rights violations. International norms affect local 
advocacy networks, assisting in the spread of new ideas and concepts and 
making previously unimagined options and strategies possible. I found that 
international human rights norms had a significant impact on the path of 
transitional justice advocacy in South Korea, especially in the final stage. 
However, “ideas do not float freely,” and international norms need to first 
be grappled with by local actors, and then undergo a process of interaction 
with political institutions, civil society, and political culture.62
Evidence of the impact of international human rights concepts and norms 
can be easily identified in the later phase of the advocacy movement. In 
1998, several national and international conferences on the Jeju 4.3 events 
were convened.63 The International Conference on Peace and Human Rights 
in 21st Century East Asia, organized by the Jeju 4.3 Research Institute, was 
the largest and most influential of these. This conference involved 500 activ-
ists and scholars from Taiwan, Japan, and Korea, as well as internationally 
prominent activists and scholars, including 1996 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 
José Ramos-Horta from East Timor, Fazel Randera, a commissioner of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and a former Japanese 
60. Peter J. KatzensteIn, the culture of natIonal securIty: norms and IdentIty In world PolItIcs 5 
(1996).
61. Sriram, supra note 16, at 394; Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The 
Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 chI. J. Int’l l. 
1, 2 (2001).
62. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic 
Structures, and the End of the Cold War, 48 Int’l org. 185 (1994), Amitav Acharya, 
How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change 
in Asia Regionalism, 58 Int’l org. 239 (2004).
63. There have been three notable conferences, held by the National Committee for the 50th 
Anniversary of the Jeju 4.3 Events (28 Apr. 1998), the 50th Anniversary Commemoration 
Committee for the Jeju 4.3 Events through the Cultural and Academic Projects (9 Apr. 
1998), and the Jeju 4.3 Research Institute (21–25 Aug. 1998). See also 4.3 rePortIng 
team, 4.3 sPeaKs (Seoul: Jeonyeweon, 1997); Bruce Cumings, The Question of American 
Responsibility for the Suppression of the Chejudo Uprising (paper presented at the 50th 
Anniversary Conference on the Jeju 4.3, Tokyo, 1998), available at http://www.iacenter.
org/Koreafiles/ktc-cumings.htm; Chang-Hoon Ko, US Government Responsibility in the 
Jeju April Third Uprising an Grand Massacre—Islanders’ Perspective, 8 JIbang Jeongbu 
yeongu (study of regIonal government) 123–140 (2004).
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senator, Den Hideo.64 Den Hideo came to prominence in 1973, when he led 
an international campaign to rescue Kim Dae Jung after he was kidnapped by 
the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. Den Hideo met with Kim Dae Jung 
during his visit to Korea for the conference, which also helped to publicize 
the Jeju 4.3 events. This is another example of an effective strategy—lever-
age politics—used by local activists. Activists intentionally invited Senator 
Den to the conference because he was someone who could exert maximum 
influence over Kim Dae Jung by reminding him of his past promises.65
The conference drew not only local but national and international at-
tention to the Jeju 4.3 cause. Seizing on this important opportunity, activists 
strategically reinterpreted and reframed the Jeju 4.3 events and massacres 
using the discourse of human rights. This change was timely and important 
because the human rights discourse began to gain wide currency in South 
Korean society with the inauguration of Kim Dae Jung, who was known for 
his lifelong fight for liberal democracy and human rights. In this way the 
Jeju 4.3 events, which had been conventionally defined as either communist 
rebellion by the right or democratic uprising by the left, were reframed as 
a human rights issue. Scholars and activists saw the possibilities for fram-
ing the atrocities in terms of the more general and contemporary notion 
of human rights violations in order to appeal to a general audience. The 
term “human rights violations” began to be used more frequently after the 
international conference. It appealed to the national audience, which was 
not familiar with the Jeju 4.3 events, and therefore in a sense represented a 
strategic move to reframe the Jeju 4.3 events as a violation of human rights.
The use of the concept of human rights violations also had a further, 
unintended consequence. By focusing on human rights violations, activ-
ists were temporarily freed from the ideologically controversial baggage of 
the Jeju 4.3 events themselves. When activists spoke of the “mass murder 
of innocent civilians,” the question of whether the dead had really been 
innocent was always raised, leading to a debate around the ideological 
nature of the Jeju 4.3 events.66 Such debates usually became bogged down 
in the inconclusive divide between civilians and combatants or active and 
reluctant participants. When the concept of “human rights violations” was 
used, on the other hand, greater emphasis was placed on the violators of 
human rights—the state—and less on the characteristics of the victims and 
events.67 Although human rights abuses by the leftist guerrillas were also 
64. Yang Jo Hun, The “Success” of Unprecedented International Events, JemIn-Ilbo, 24 Oct. 
2011; Yang Jo Hun, Reaffirming the ‘Human Rights’ Alliance in the East Asia, JemIn-Ilbo, 
26 October 2011.
65. Interview with Kang Chang Il, supra note 32.
66. Kim, Seeking Truth after 50 Years, supra note 2. 
67. Id. at 415.
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raised, the focus was more on state violence, which constituted about eighty 
percent of the violations.68
C. Pressure from International Civil Society
International governmental organizations and NGOs are an integral part of 
the international structure, and scholars have noted the growing role of sup-
port from and involvement of international governmental organizations and 
NGOs in transitional justice processes.69 However, my research did not find 
any evidence of the direct impact of international governmental organiza-
tions or NGOs in the South Korean case. One reason for this may be found 
in the response of Juan E. Mendez, a former President of the International 
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), when I asked him why the ICTJ did not 
work in South Korea.70 He observed that the ICTJ usually becomes involved 
when it receives a request from a government or local NGO—apparently 
there had been no such request in the South Korean case. His answer sug-
gests one possible mechanism through which international actors influence 
the establishment of truth commissions. Although international actors are 
necessary, it is the initial request by local actors themselves that is more 
important in attracting the expertise and know-how of such international 
actors. This is consistent with my finding that the experience of neighboring 
countries is most effective when actively utilized by local actors. Thus, the 
South Korean experience confirms that two critical international factors—the 
diffusion effect and pressure from international civil society—were mainly 
driven by local demands and efforts.
On the other hand, there is strong evidence that Korean-Japanese who 
were originally from Jeju played a significant role. Recent studies have 
revealed the importance of diaspora populations in the truth commission 
process.71 Korean-Japanese made three main contributions to the transitional 
68. JeJu commIssIon, supra note 3; Jieun Chang, National Narrative, Traumatic Memory and 
Testimony: Reading Traces of the Cheju April Third Incident, South Korea, 1948, 86 (2009) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University), available at http://gradworks.umi.
com/3365697.pdf. 
69. See Post-conflIct JustIce, supra note 16; mInow, supra note 16, at 126–28, 138; Thomas 
Buergenthal, The United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, 27 vand. J. transnat’l 
l. 497, 542 (1994).
70. Mendez was invited to the talk titled, For One; For All—International Human Rights 
(with Kathryn Sikkink), which was a part of series of A Great Conversation hosted by 
the University of Minnesota, 24 Apr. 2007; Mr. Mendez also had informal discussions 
with faculty members and students in the Dean’s Conference Room at the University 
of Minnesota Law School, 24 Apr. 2007. 
71. Laura A. Young & Rosalyn Park, Engaging Diasporas in Truth Commissions: Lessons from 
the Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission Diaspora Project, 3 Int’l J. transIt’l J.341 
(2009); Ezekiel Pajibo, Civil Society and Transitional Justice in Liberia: A Practitioner’s 
Reflection from the Field, 1 Int’l J. transIt’l Just. 287 (2007).
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justice process in South Korea. However, the role of Korean-Japanese should 
not be understood as a purely international effect but as an international-
ized local influence.
First, Japan—specifically, Korean communities in Japan—provided a 
refuge for people fleeing Jeju during the Jeju 4.3 events, and served as a 
repository of written records, memories, and alternative discourses. This was 
crucial, because the South Korean government systematically destroyed any 
evidence of the Jeju 4.3 events.72 Thus, records, memories, and narratives 
created and maintained in Japan played an important role in the transitional 
justice movement immediately after democratization in 1987 because little 
documentation remained in South Korea and victims were still reluctant to 
talk about the massacres. Activists and scholars therefore relied heavily on 
materials written in Japan.
For example, in 1957, Kim Seok Beom, a Korean-Japanese originally 
from Jeju, published a novel, The Death of a Crow, based on the Jeju 4.3 
events. Kim also wrote a later novel, A Volcanic Island, which was serial-
ized in a major Japanese newspaper over approximately twenty years. Kim 
wrote constantly on the theme of Jeju and the massacres. His work was read 
widely, not only by Korean-Japanese but also by the general Japanese public. 
In addition, his works were translated into Korean and became popular in 
South Korea after democratization.73 Kim’s work had an undeniable influence 
on a small but significant transitional justice advocacy movement in Japan. 
In 1963, another important book, A History of the Jeju People’s 4.3 Armed 
Struggle by Kim Bong Hyun and Kim Min Joo, was published in Japan. The 
authors, who were former communist guerrillas, documented the process of 
the campaign in detail using extensive interviews with participants in the Jeju 
4.3 events who had taken refuge in Japan. This book was important because 
it was the only historical and nonfictional record written by guerrillas in the 
period soon after the events took place.74
Second, the Korean-Japanese community was also a place where people 
were able to secretly commemorate the Jeju 4.3 events and perpetuate the 
memories of the victims through small but public memorial services. On 3 
April 1988, several Korean Japanese from Jeju—including writer Kim Seok 
Beom and former guerrilla Kim Min Joo—held the first public memorial ser-
vice in Tokyo, and such services later became an annual event. These small 
72. Kim, Seeking Truth after 50 Years, supra note 2, at 414. 
73. In Search of “People’s Peace” in East Asia: On the Crossroads of Historical Experiences 
between Japan and Korea, Peace stud. bull. no. 26 (Peace Studies Association of Japan, 
Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan), Oct. 2007, at 7, available at http://www.psaj.org/html/
psajnle26.pdf.
74. Bong Hyun Jim & Min Joo Kim, Jeju-do Inmindeul-ui 4.3 Mujangtujaengsa [A History of 
Jeju People’s 4.3 Armed Struggle], in JeJu mInJung hangJeang [JeJu PeoPle’s uPrIsIng] (Arari 
Research Institute ed. 1988).
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gatherings had a lasting impact on the trajectory of the movement because 
two university students studying in Japan participated in the memorial ser-
vices and went on to become leaders of the transitional justice movement 
in South Korea. Kang Chang Il served as a director of the Jeju 4.3 Research 
Institute and is currently a congressman representing Jeju province; while 
Kim Myeong Sik published important books on the Jeju 4.3 events and 
participated in the establishment of the Jeju 4.3 Research Institute.75
Third, the Korean-Japanese were actively engaged in the enactment 
movement in 1999 and worked to empower local activism from the outside. 
A few prominent figures, such as Seo Seung, a renowned human rights activ-
ist, actively participated in the later stages of the movement and represented 
the victims in Japan. Others organized public lectures, conferences, and 
memorial concerts to help publicize the Jeju 4.3 events to both the Korean- 
Japanese and the Japanese general public. All of these activities served as a 
symbol that the Jeju 4.3 events were not only an issue of local and national 
importance but were also of international importance. In a sense, Japanese 
senator Den Hideo’s visit to the 1998 international conference was made 
possible by the persistent activism of the Korean-Japanese.
VI. CoNCLUSIoN
This article outlined why local advocacy networks, comprising local students 
and scholars, social activists, and journalists, were the most important ac-
tors in the transitional justice process, facilitating conducive domestic and 
international conditions, taking advantage of the positive factors, and fight-
ing hard against constraints and obstacles. However, these findings have 
two further implications that extend beyond the South Korean experience.
First, it draws our attention to the role of non-elite actors in shaping tran-
sitional justice process. By using social movement theory and transnational 
advocacy networks theory, this article has moved away from the traditional 
decision-making model of political elites that has frequently been used by 
scholars in the past.76 The elite model looks at the decision-making process 
of elite groups and treats the demand for truth and justice from civil society 
as one of many elements that affect the elites’ decision-making process. 
75. In Search of “People’s Peace” in East Asia, supra note 73, at 7.
76. See generally huntIngton, supra note 15; Geoff Dancy & Steven C. Poe, What Comes 
Before Truth? The Political Determinants of Truth Commission Onset (paper prepared for 
presentation at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association Conference, 
San Diego, California, 22–25 Mar. 2006), available at http://citation.allacademic.com/
meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/9/3/2/pages99320/p99320-1.php; Jack Snyder & 
Leslie Vinjamuri, Trial and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International 
Justice, 28 Int’l sec. 5, 6 (2003).
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However, by focusing on the decision-makers, this approach neglects the 
dynamics and history of grassroots advocacy and therefore cannot adequately 
explain the way in which the demand for truth and justice becomes increas-
ingly effective over time. Moreover, because the characteristics of elites are 
idiosyncratic, studies are often reduced to an examination of the politi-
cal environment that leaders face in their decision-making. In addition, a 
decision-making model sets the prior goals of decision-makers as stability, 
power, survival, or peace, and approaches truth commissions in terms of their 
instrumental value in achieving or obstructing these objectives. In such an 
approach, the intrinsic value of truth commissions and the voices of victims 
and activists are generally disregarded. Thus, this article’s theoretical frame-
work provides an empirically and ethically comprehensive understanding 
of the process and circumstances behind the transitional justice process.
Second, the South Korean case has a broader implication for the emerging 
global trend that has been referred to as the “truth commission phenomenon.” 
Since the 1980s, more and more countries have undergone the transition 
from authoritarianism to democracy, and the recent wave of democratization 
in the Middle East and Northern Africa suggests that this trend will continue 
in the twenty-first century. Transitional countries are increasingly expected 
to address their past human rights violations. To date, thirty-five countries 
have used such commissions, with five new commissions established in 
2009 alone.77 In addition, there is an upward trend in the number of years 
of human rights violations that are being investigated by recent commis-
sions. In other words, the temporal mandate of recent commissions has been 
expanded considerably.78 Some recent commissions have been established 
to investigate events that took place more than forty years (e.g. Morocco, 
Kenya, and Togo) and, in extreme cases, 100 years ago (e.g. South Korea). 
Further, many countries are creating truth commissions at multiple points in 
time after their transition to democracy. Countries such as Uganda, Uruguay, 
Chile, and Ecuador have already created their second truth commissions.79 
In other words, not only is the number of truth commissions increasing, but 
their function is becoming both more extensive and more intensive.
What explains this growing truth commission phenomenon around the 
world? One answer may be found in my research on the South Korean case. 
The impetus is primarily being provided by local actors, who are constantly 
struggling to make both domestic and international structures favorable to 
the creation of truth commissions. The space for the phenomenon is opened 
77. hayner, supra note 7, at 6.
78. Dancy, Kim & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, supra note 7, at 57.
79. Truth Commission: Uruguay, United States Institute of Peace, available at http://www.
usip.org/publications/truth-commission-uruguay; see website for information on other 
truth commissions.
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up by their conscious strategic efforts to create and change the domestic 
and international structures. Structures are not fixed entities but constantly 
changing environments. Local activists in South Korea have clearly shown 
that the domestic and international structures—both opportunities and con-
straints—can be made, remade, and unmade through consistent activism 
and effective and timely strategies. Sometimes small but innovative first steps 
such as the 1993 petition movement and the 1960 private investigation by 
local students can make a big difference. At other times, timely and effec-
tive strategies, such as the 1992 strategic announcement of the discovery of 
the Darangshi cave, local investigative journalism, the introduction of the 
Taiwanese case to Jeju, and the deliberate use of human rights discourse 
to overcome ideological divides and draw national attention to the mas-
sacres can change the prevailing dynamics and turn a hostile structure into 
a conducive environment.
